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Abstract 
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms on voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia. The sample consists of 87 companies from the Saudi Stock 
Market. The data are collected from the annual reports for the available financial years 2006 and 2007. It is 
found that corporate governance mechanisms play a vital role in providing quality reporting. Most corporate 
governance mechanisms, especially non-executive directors, board size, CEO duality, audit quality, and 
government ownership, have a significant contribution in providing quality voluntary disclosure. The findings of 
this study provide evidence on the effectiveness of corporate governance as a mechanism of monitoring power to 
provide users with adequate and sufficient information. The findings of this study have important implications 
for authority regulators, policy makers, shareholders and other users of reports who have an interest in best 
practices of corporate governance. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Voluntary Disclosure, Saudi Arabia 
 
1. Introduction 
The numerous bankruptcies and business failures that have happened in gigantic companies around the world 
such as Enron, World com and Paramalat in 2002 have pressed several corporate governance committees and 
organizations around the world to produce a number of reports and establish rules that can help in monitoring 
and controlling management systems. These reports include the Cadbury Report (1992) and Greenbury Report 
(1995) in the UK, the Business Roundtable (1997) and Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) in the US, the King 
Committee Report (1994) in South Africa and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Principles (1999, 2004). It is believed that in order for companies to become internationally competitive 
and be able to attract foreign capital, they need to adopt commonly accepted standards of corporate governance 
(Solomon, Lin, Norton and Solomon, 2003). 
The corporate governance system has started to establish strong roots in the Middle East markets, especially 
from the beginning of this century. Additionally, it is also supported by several international organizations that 
are interested in corporate governance. Miteva (2005) stated that the OECD had embarked on improving the 
corporate governance initiative in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The OECD – MENA initiative is 
aimed at modernizing the government structures and proceeding with corporate governance practices in MENA 
countries. Additionally, it is aimed at improving the policies and environment for investment in the region. As a 
result, the code of corporate governance was established in Saudi Arabia in 2006. 
Adequate disclosure of information is essential because without such information, it is not possible to properly 
judge the opportunities and risks of investment. According to Meek, Roberts, and Gray (1995), there is 
uncertainty about the quality of firms (e.g. in terms of the nature of their assets and riskiness of cash flows) and 
their securities. Thus, investors demand information to assess the timing and uncertainty of current and future 
cash flows so that they may value firms and make other investment decisions. Additional disclosure will help 
investors to reduce the likelihood of making the wrong investment decisions. Furthermore, the change in the 
environment and the increase in business complexity are giving rise to additional demands for information 
(FASB, 2001). Companies satisfy this demand by voluntarily supplying additional information in their annual 
reports. 
The issues of disclosure and corporate governance have dominated the headlines of the world’s business press in 
recent years. Various studies have been published in several countries such as the US, the UK, Continental 
European Countries and West Asian Countries (e.g. Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Donnelly & 
Mulcahy, 2008; Forker, 1992; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ho & Wong, 2001; Lakhal, 2005). Most of the empirical 
studies in different countries around the world that examined the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms (e.g. board structure) and voluntary disclosure provide mixed results ( e.g. Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; 
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Gul & Lenug, 2004; Ho & Wong, 2001; Labelle, 2002). In contrast, there is no published research to date that 
has examined the nature of the association between corporate governance and disclosure among firms in Saudi 
Arabia. 
The examination of the relationship between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms in oil 
rich countries like Saudi Arabia will, therefore, contribute to the existing knowledge on disclosure and corporate 
governance. In recognizing the importance of the adequacy of disclosure and corporate governance, it is vital to 
have a study that focuses on developing a framework and benchmarking the disclosure level among companies 
in the Middle East, specifically in Saudi Arabia. 
 
2. Background on Corporate Governance and Corporate Reporting Regulations in Saudi Arabia 
There are several rules and regulations that support the implementation of corporate governance in Saudi listed 
companies. In 1985, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued the Disclosure and Transparency standard. 
Corporate governance is supported by issuing this standard because, disclosure and transparency is considered to 
be one of the most important elements of corporate governance best practice. The action of issuing this standard 
was one of the important decisions in the development of accounting and reporting practices in Saudi Arabia 
because the disclosure requirements had been very low beforehand (Al-Mulhem, 1997).  
The latest progression of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia has witnessed the development and issuing of the 
code of corporate governance in the year 2006. The code was prepared to harmonize with international standards 
of corporate governance such as the OECD principles. It contains three main parts: the Rights of Shareholders 
and the General Assembly, Disclosure and Transparency, and Board of Directors.  
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1 The Proportion of Non-Executive Directors on the Board  
The agency problem emerged from the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers where managers 
have the tendency to maximize their interests at the expense of shareholders’ welfare (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This interest has led shareholders to be more eager to monitor the managers by delegating authority to the 
board of directors to monitor and control the decisions made by managers. For directors to be more effective and 
act in the shareholders’ interests there should be a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board.  
Several empirical studies that examined the relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board and voluntary disclosure, found a positive relationship (e.g  Forker, 1992; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Arcay 
and Vazquez, 2005). Based on the argument of agency theory that having more non-executive directors on the 
board provides more power to monitor management to disclose more information, the study suggests the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1. There is a positive association between the proportion of non-executive directors and voluntary 
disclosure. 
3.2 The Proportion of Family Members on the Board 
Family members on the board might have an influence on disclosure practices. The agency problem is not only 
about the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers but also between the majority and minority 
shareholders. Marisela (2005) found that the corporations in Latin America are controlled by family members 
and that the agency problem is between the majority and minority shareholders. Thus, it can be predicted that the 
presence of family members on the board is related to lower disclosure because they have greater access to 
information and they do not have the intention of disclosing this information to others.  
Several empirical studies that examined the association between the proportion of family members on the board 
and voluntary disclosure have found a significant negative association (e.g. Ho & Wong, 2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002; Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009). Thus, the study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 2. There is a negative association between the proportion of family members on the board and 
voluntary disclosure.   
3.3 Board Size 
There are different views and arguments on the issue of board size. There is an argument supporting the idea of 
increasing board size. Resource Dependency theory argues that large board size has a variety of knowledge and 
more ability to manage the capital resource of the company (Pfeffer, 1972). While, another view argues that 
small board size provides more quality of monitoring because there is no contradiction in thinking or objectives 
among directors. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) stated that large board size is dysfunctional because a large number 
of directors are easy to be controlled by top managers and, therefore, they cannot criticize the policies of the top 
managers or discuss the performance of the company truthfully.  
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The view of small board size is also supported by several committees and reports on best practices of corporate 
governance around the world, which recommend a limitation on board size such as the Hampel Report (1998), 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2000, Revised 2007), and Saudi Code of Corporate Governance 
(2006). 
Several empirical studies found a significant association between board size and disclosure ( e.g. Yermack, 1996; 
Vafeas, 2000; Byard, Lin, and Weintrop, 2006). Based on the argument that small board size leads to quality 
monitoring and better disclosure, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive association between small board size and voluntary disclosure.    
3.4 Independent Audit Committee Members 
The audit committee has a vital role in ensuring the quality of financial reporting, reviewing and assessing 
internal control systems and monitoring the relationship between management and the external auditor (NACD, 
2000). This role will help the users of these reports to make optimal decisions. The most important characteristic 
of audit committees is that the majority of their members should be independent. Most of the corporate 
governance codes and regulations around the world, such as Cadbury 1992, the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, and 
Saudi Corporate Governance Code 2006, require audit committees to consist of a majority of independent 
members.  
Previous studies that found a positive relationship between the existence of an audit committee and voluntary 
disclosure such as (Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Ho & Wong, 2001). Based on the argument that independent audit 
committee members provide better knowledge and quality reporting, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis  4.  There is a positive association between the independence of audit committee members and 
voluntary disclosure. 
3.5 Separation of the CEO and Chair Positions 
Separation of the positions of Chairman and CEO could enhance independent board leadership and help in fully 
representing the interests of the shareholders. Agency theory supports the separation of the positions of 
Chairman and CEO from the view of independence, because, an independent Chairman can monitor and oversee 
the activities of the CEO and top managers. Prior studies found a positive association between the separation of 
the CEO and the Chariman positions and voluntary disclosure such as Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), and Lakha (2005). Based on the argument of agency theory that an independent Chairman 
provides strong power to the board in effectively monitoring and demanding sufficient disclosure information, it 
is hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 5. There is a positive relationship between the separation of the CEO and Chairman positions and 
voluntary disclosure. 
3.6 Audit Quality (Big 4)  
Audit quality is defined as the joint probability of detecting and reporting material financial statement errors 
(DeAngelo, 1981). Thus, audit quality is linked to enhance the quality of information disclosure. Agency theory 
has a strong link with audit quality because an independent big audit firm has more ability to elevate the agency 
problem by providing high reliable and credible information (Francis & Wilson, 1988; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
According to DeAngelo (1981) the big audit firms are likely to disclose more information in order to reduce their 
legal liability. Several studies that examined the association of Big audit firms with reporting quality such as 
Makhija and Patton (2004), Bassett, Koh, and Tutticci (2007), Kelton and Yang (2008), and Barros et.al (2013) 
found a positive association between Big 4 audit firms and disclosure information. Based on the argument that 
Big 4 audit firms provide quality information, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 6. There is a positive association between audit quality and voluntary disclosure. 
3.7 Government Ownership 
Modern corporations are characterized by the separation of ownership and management. This separation has led 
to the emergence of agency theory, which focuses on the conflict of interests between ownership and 
management. Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that in companies with a dispersed ownership, the potential for 
conflicts between shareholders and managers are greater than in companies with less dispersed ownership.   
Ownership structure especially government ownership in GCC countries is highly concentrated because most of 
the listed companies are family or government owned companies. Therefore, the governments still hold a high 
percentage of shares in the companies that they own. For example, the Saudi government holds more than 30% 
of Saudi listed companies (Alajlan, 2004).  
Empirical studies have examined the impact of government ownership on company growth, performance and 
disclosure, and found a negative impact. Barth at al. (1999) found that high government ownership in banks is 
associated with lower efficiency, less saving and borrowing, slower growth and lower productivity. Makhija and 
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Patton (2004) found that there is no significant positive relationship between government ownership and 
voluntary disclosure. Based on the argument that the government owns a high percentage of shares in Saudi 
Arabia and government ownership has no interest in providing sufficient information, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 7. There is a negative association between government ownership and voluntary disclosure. 
 
4. Data Methodology 
4.1 Sample Selection 
The Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) consists of six countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and 
the United Arab Emirates), which share the same culture, religion, language and economic characteristics 
including their high dependence on oil revenue. Furthermore, according to Ameinfo (2006), as quoted by the 
Magazine of the FTSE Global Markets (2006), the GCC stock markets had a combined total of 528 listed 
companies at the end of 2005 with a capitalization of 1.16 trillion US dollars. Saudi Arabia has the largest capital 
market among other GCC countries with 685.3 billion US dollars. Thus, the study consists of 87 Saudi listed 
companies. The study used the annual reports to collect the data on voluntary disclosure for the years 2006 and 
2007. The study uses the two years as the available years after publishing the corporate governance code in 2006. 
4.2 Voluntary Disclosure Measurement (Dependent Variable)  
Unlike previous studies (example Meek et al. 2000; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003), which used the dichotomous 
approach (1 disclosed and 0 otherwise), the current study  using new methodology of measuring voluntary 
disclosure. The study using three levels of disclosure (2 if fully disclosed; 1 slightly disclosed, 0 not disclosed) in 
measuring the level and quality of voluntary disclosure (Al-Janadi Y. et al. (2012).  
The voluntary disclosure index is divided into three main categories: General and Financial Information, 
Corporate Governance Information and Social and Environmental Information.  The first category describes the 
general and financial information including information on General Information, Corporate Strategy, Vision and 
Mission, Acquisition and Disposal, Research and Development, and Future Prospects. The second category 
discusses the disclosure information on corporate governance, which includes information on Board of Directors 
Information, Responsibilities of the Board of Directors,, Board Structure,  Board Performance, Risk 
Management, Ownership Structure, and Auditing. The last category describes the social and environmental 
information, which includes information on Employee Training, Distribution of Employees, Employee Welfare, 
Environmental Policies, Environmental Performance, Environmental Protection, Social Community Programmes, 
Social Policies-Customer Health, and Social Product Information.  
4.3 Measuring Independent Variables  
The measurement of the variables used in this study is summarized in Table 1. The measurement of the 
dependent variable is discussed in the previous section. The measurement of independent variables is collected 
from the annual reports similar to several prior studies such as Chen and Jaggi (2000), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
Arcay and Vazquez (2005), and Barako, Hancock, and Izan (2006). The inclusion of the control variables in this 
study is to avoid voluntary disclosure being influenced by these control variables. Several of the control 
variables found in empirical studies in the literature (e.g. Chau & Gray, 2002; Ho & Wong, 2001; Makhija & 
Patton, 2004) have an impact on voluntary disclosure. These variables are firm size, industry type and 
profitability. They are included in this study for testing the main hypotheses. 
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Table 1 
Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Variables Notation Measurement Dependent variable  
Voluntary Disclosure  VDISC Total number of points awarded for voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial information. 
Independent Variables    
The proportion of non-
executive directors on the 
board: 
PNEDB 
The number of NED on the board divided by the total 
number of directors on the board (Ho and Wong, 
2001), 
The proportion of family 
members on the board PFAMILY 
The ratio of family members on the board to the total 
number of directors.  
Board Size  BSIZE Number of directors on the board 
Independent audit 
committee members: IAUDCOM 
The number of independent audit committee members 
divided by the total number of members of the audit 
committee. 
Separation of the CEO and 
Chair positions: CEOCHAI 
The variable is coded 1 if there is separation between 
the CEO and Chairman position and 0 otherwise.  
Audit Quality ( Big 4) B4 The variable takes the value 1 if the company audited by one of the Big four audit firms and 0 otherwise.  
Government Ownership GOVEOW Sum of the percentage of equity shares owned by the government. 
Foreign Ownership  FOROW Sum of the percentage of equity shares owned by foreign investors.  
Control Variables    
Firm Size  FSIZE Logarithm of total assets  
Financial sector FIN Coded as 1 if the firm belongs to the finance or insurance sector and 0 otherwise. 
Industrial sectors IND Coded as 1 if the firm belongs to the industry or cement sectors and 0 otherwise.  
Services  SERV Coded as 1 if firm belongs to other sectors and 0 otherwise 
Profitability ROE Return on Equity  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Results 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the overall voluntary disclosure of each category of the index.  
The results show that overall voluntary disclosure in Saudi listed companies is low with an average of 31.73 per 
cent. Despite the low level of the voluntary disclosure index in Saudi listed companies, it is still in a good 
position compared with the level of voluntary disclosure in other developed and developing countries. For 
example, the average level of voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong is 29 per cent (Ho & Wong, 2001); in Malaysia 
it is 31 per cent (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006), in Singapore it is 29 per cent (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006), and in 
U.S. it is 47 per cent (Francis, Nanda, & Olsson 2008). 
The results also show that the corporate governance disclosure category is the highest category of disclosure 
with an average of 41.54 per cent followed by general and financial information with an average of 39.56. The 
lowest category of disclosure is the social and environmental disclosure category with an average of 14.61 per 
cent as shown in Table 2. This result indicates that although Saudi Arabia is an oil producing country and has 
many oil companies, these oil companies do not show great concern for the environment. 
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Table 2 
Summary of Statistics for Voluntary Disclosure Score 
Categories of Voluntary Disclosure Average of VD 
General and Financial Information 39.56 
Corporate Governance Disclosure 41.54 
Social and Environmental Disclosure 14.61 
Overall Voluntary Disclosure 31.73 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
Variables  N Mini Max Mean 
Non-Executive Directors (NED) 87 2 12 7.07 
The proportion of Non-Executive Directors on the Board (PNEDB, %) 87 40 100 83.52 
Board Size (BSIZE) 87 4 13 8.43 
Family members on the board (FAMILYNO) 87 0 6 1.13 
Proportion of Family members on the board (PFAMILY, %) 87 0 100 13.33 
Independent Audit Committee Members on the Board (IAUDCOM) 87 2 6 2.99 
The Total of Audit Committee Members on the Board (AUDCOM) 87 2 6 3.20 
Proportion of Independent Audit Committee Members on the Board 
(PIAUDCOM, %) 87 40 100 94.41 
Government Ownership (GOVOW, %) 87 0 81 11.19 
Foreign Ownership (FOROW, %) 25 0 44.7 17.49 
 
The descriptive statistics of the independent variables are illustrated in Table 3.  Regarding the board structure, 
the results show that the average number of NEDs on the board is 7.07 comprising 84 per cent of the total 
number of directors. The average size of the board is 8 members, while the average number of family members 
on the board is only 1 member. This result is consistent with the findings of prior studies such as Eng and Mak 
(2003), and Cheng and Courtenay (2006) who found that the average board size is 7 members. Table 3 also 
shows that the average of IAUDCOM members is 3 members with 94 per cent being independent members. The 
result is consistent with the recommendations of the Corporate Governance Code in Saudi Arabia which 
indicates that the number of audit committee members has to be at least three fully independent members. 
Regarding government ownership, the results in Table 3 show that the average of government ownership is 11 
per cent. This result indicates that the government ownership is high in Saudi listed companies. The result is 
supported by Baydoun and Willet (2006) who stated that a high percentage of government ownership is common 
in most GCC countries.  
5.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
The correlation analysis has been used for measuring the degree of multicollinearity. The result found that there 
is no multicollinearity among independent and dependent variables, (the result it not represent). Multivariate 
analysis is used in order to examine the association between two or more variables. Table 4 reports the linear 
regression results for all the variables except for the variable of foreign ownership, which is excluded from the 
regression because 71 per cent of companies have missing values on foreign ownership and therefore, including 
the variable would create bias in the results. 
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Table 4 
Results of OLS Regression Analysis of CG Mechanisms with Voluntary Disclosure 
 
Variables  Coeff t-statistics 
Constant   -1.454 
Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms   
Proportion of Non-Executive Directors on the Board (PNEDB) .333 3.977*** 
Proportion of Family Members on the Board .095 1.194 
Board Size .184 2.441** 
Proportion of Independent Audit Committee Members .076 .935 
Separation of the CEO and Chairman Positions -.220 -2.476** 
External Corporate Governance Mechanisms   
Audit Quality (Big 4) .190 2.360** 
Government Ownership -.157 -1.747* 
Control Variables – Firm-specifics   
Firm Size .371 3.563*** 
Profitability (ROE) .060 .705 
Financial Sector .306 3.066*** 
Services Sector -.040 -.491 
R 0.784 
R2 0.614 
Adjusted R2  0.558 
F-value  10.858*** 
N= 87 
*p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
***p < .001. 
Table 4 demonstrates the linear regression for the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
voluntary disclosure in Saudi companies. The results in Table 4 show that there is a highly positive significant 
(p >0.001) relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board (PNEDB) and voluntary 
disclosure. Thus, hypothesis H1, which stated that the proportion of non-executive directors on the board has a 
positive impact on the level of voluntary disclosure is supported. It is noteworthy that the PNEDB is a very 
important explanatory variable in the regression model, as indicated by its coefficient value. A possible 
explanation for this result is that NEDs in Saudi companies have the ability to contribute by providing good 
quality reporting, which can help users to make good decisions.  
Hypothesis 2 states that the proportion of family members on the board has a negative impact on voluntary 
disclosure. The proportion of family members on the board is found to have no negative impact on the voluntary 
disclosure in Saudi companies, thus, rejecting Hypothesis 2. A possible explanation for the insignificant result 
might be that 57 out of the 87 companies do not have any family members on the board. Additionally, the other 
30 companies have minority family members on the board with an average of only 1 family member on the 
board. The result indicates that due to the low rate of family members on the board they could not dominate the 
managers and influence the level of voluntary disclosure.  
The result of this study in Table 4 shows that board size in Saudi companies has a positively significant (p > 0.01) 
association with voluntary disclosure, thus hypothesis H3 is rejected. The significant positive association is 
inconsistent with many prior studies including Vafeas (2000), and Arcay and Vazquez (2005) who found a 
positive significant relationship between small boards and disclosure. The result of this study indicates that a 
large number of directors on the board gives more ability to the board to cover its activities and also provide 
sufficient information to the shareholders. This result is supported by Resource Dependency Theory which 
argues that a large board size has greater ability to manage the capital resources of the company because it has a 
variety of experts and qualified directors.  
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Hypothesis 4 considers a positive relationship between independent audit committee members (PIAUCOM) and 
voluntary disclosure. The results in Table 4 show that the relationship between independent audit committee 
members and voluntary disclosure is statistically insignificant, thus, rejecting H4. This result is consistent with 
prior studies (Ho & Wong, 2001; Abdullah & Mohd-Nasir, 2004). The insignificant result indicates that audit 
committees are not playing a sufficient role in providing adequate and quality information despite the fact that 
the earlier descriptive analysis found that most Saudi companies have fully independent audit committees. One 
of the explanations for this finding might be due to the low experience of audit committee members. 
Additionally, there are no regulations in Saudi companies that determine and illustrate the vital role of audit 
committee members. These reasons are supported by the finding of  Abdul Rahman and Al-Janadi (2006). 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that there is a positive relationship between the separation of the CEO and Chairman 
positions and voluntary disclosure. The result in Table 4 indicates that there is a statistically negative significant 
(p> 0.05) relationship between the separation of the CEO and Chairman positions (CEOCHAIR) and voluntary 
disclosure, which means that the result is contrary to the assumption of the study, thus H5 is rejected. This means 
that companies with CEO duality provide more information than companies with a separation of the two 
positions. A possible explanation for this result is that the combination of the two positions in one person, 
provides the power and ability to shape the company in achieving its objectives and strategies because there is no 
intervention from one position holder or contradiction between the two positions. The finding supports the 
stewardship theory, which considers that there is no inherent general problem of executive motivation. 
According to this theory, the executive manager essentially wants to do a good job and to be a good steward of 
the corporate assets. 
Audit Quality enhances the quality of information disclosure. Hypothesis 6 predicts that there is a positive 
association between the Big four audit firms and the disclosure of information. Table 4 supports this hypothesis 
and shows that the variable of big four audit firms has the second most statistically positive significance (p < 
0.001) with voluntary disclosure. This implies that the Big four auditors in Saudi companies have more 
independence than non Big four auditors. These characteristics reflect their effectiveness in providing more 
voluntary disclosure information. The result provides assurance for investors in Saudi Arabia that companies 
with Big 4 audit firms have more credible reported information. 
Hypothesis H7 expects that there will be a negative association between government ownership and voluntary 
disclosure. The results in Table 4 report a statistically significant negative (p < 0.05) impact of government 
ownership on voluntary disclosure, thus accepting Hypothesis H7. A possible explanation for this result is that 
government ownership still plays a major role in providing insufficient information for users. This negative 
impact might be because government ownership believes that getting important information is enough and that 
there is no need to disclose sufficient information to other users. 
The study controls for the impact of firm size, profitability and industry type. Table 4 shows that firm size and 
industry type have a significant positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. This finding means that large 
firms have a greater ability to provide quality reporting for investors. The result also indicates that the financial 
sector discloses more information than the service and industrial sectors. This result is consistent with the 
descriptive analysis of voluntary disclosure practices, as shown in Table 2 which presented that the financial 
sector discloses more information than the service sector and the industrial sector. The result of positive 
significance in industry type is consistent with prior studies such as Cooke (1991) and Barako et al. (2006).  
 
6. Conclusion 
The findings on corporate governance mechanisms reveal that internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms have a vital role to play in providing quality reports. For internal corporate governance mechanisms, 
the majority of non-executive directors and the large board size have the ability to contribute in providing quality 
reports, which indicates that directors are more independent in making decisions and monitoring management 
effectively to protect the interests of shareholders. Additionally, the results support the regulation of corporate 
governance best practices, which requires a majority of non- executive directors. 
In relation to the audit committee, despite 94 per cent of audit committee members being independent, it is found 
that they are not effective in providing quality reports. Thus, it is required from the Stock market regulators to 
issue guidelines on more effective roles of audit committee members that have to be implemented. 
Separating the CEO and Chairman positions has a negative impact on providing quality reporting. This means 
that combining the CEO and Chairman positions in one person provides the power and ability to shape the 
company in achieving its objectives and strategies because there is no intervention or contradiction between the 
two positions. Another explanation for the negative impact of separating the two positions on voluntary 
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disclosure might be due to the effect of government ownership on the selection of the chairman, consequently, 
government ownership has a major impact on the independence of the Chairman’s decision making. 
Concerning Audit quality, as measured by the Big Four audit firms, the result demonstrates that Big Four audit 
firms have more credibility in reporting quality information. 
For government ownership, the result shows that government ownership has a negative impact on voluntary 
disclosure. Therefore, this study suggests that government ownership of listed companies should be reduced 
thereby encouraging listed companies to effectively practice corporate governance systems. This includes 
providing more voluntary information, particularly on social and environmental information. 
This study provides evidence on the need of Saudi listed companies to have the best practices of corporate 
governance. Specifically, corporate governance mechanisms that are found to be significant determinants of the 
quality and credibility of reporting, such as a majority of non-executive directors, board size, audit quality (Big 4) 
and CEO duality. The results also contribute to the implication of resource dependency theory and information 
asymmetry theory in practicing corporate governance effectively and the complementation of these theories with 
agency theory 
This study may provide feedback to the regulators in the stock markets in Saudi Arabia concerning the 
importance of corporate governance practices in providing adequate information. Additionally, this study also 
provides regulators with information on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. Consistent with 
the findings in this study, regulators could improve the corporate governance mechanisms that were found to be 
ineffective such as the audit committee. Such improvement can be done by issuing rules that clarify the roles of 
audit committee members. 
One of the possible avenues for future research that was highlighted by this study is to extend this study to other 
Arab countries, such as those countries under the GCC umbrella or selecting other Arabic countries from 
different regions to make comparisons between them. Another additional area for future research is to examine 
the effectiveness of additional attributes of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure such as other variables 
of ownership structure (e.g. Institutional ownership, concentration ownership). 
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